

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

<b>CHRISTOPHER R. HECKER,</b>	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	
v.	:	<b>CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-CV-2701</b>
	:	
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, :</b>		
<i>et al.,</i>	:	
Defendants.	:	

**ORDER**

AND NOW, this        day of January, 2022, upon consideration of Plaintiff Christopher R. Hecker's *pro se* Complaint (ECF No. 2), it is **ORDERED** that:

1. For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum, the Complaint is

**DISMISSED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE AND IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE** as follows:

- a. Hecker's § 1983 claims regarding constitutional violations arising during his time at State Correctional Institution – Phoenix are **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE** pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
- b. Hecker's § 1983 deliberate indifference claims regarding his medical care against Defendant Lt. John Doe and against any other non-medical prison officials are **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**.
- c. Hecker's claims regarding a plot by the Central Intelligence Agency to target and monitor him are **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

2. Hecker may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order with respect to the following constitutional claims: (1) a First Amendment access to the courts claim; (2) an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force; (3) Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference related to his medical treatment; and (4) Eighth Amendment claims regarding the conditions of his confinement. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Hecker's claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Hecker should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing the certain factual allegations and claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so **ORDERED** by the Court.

3. The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to send Hecker a blank copy of the Court's form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Hecker may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.<sup>1</sup>

4. If Hecker does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled "Notice to Stand on Complaint," and shall include the civil action number for this case. *See Weber v. McGrogan*, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) ("If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the

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<sup>1</sup> This form is available on the Court's website at <http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/frmc1983f.pdf>.

district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting *Borelli v. City of Reading*, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)); *In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig.*, 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).

5. If Hecker fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Hecker intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.<sup>2</sup> See *Weber*, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).

**BY THE COURT:**

**/s/Petrese B. Tucker**

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**PETRESE B. TUCKER, J.**

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<sup>2</sup> The six-factor test announced in *Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.*, 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on his complaint. See *Weber*, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the *Poulis* factors); see also *Elansari v. Altria*, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under *Poulis* is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See *Dickens v. Danberg*, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the *Poulis* factors is not necessary.”); *Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc.*, 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six *Poulis* factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).

